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Since hope is a concept that is future oriented in a 
positive sense, the quest for human hope is a timely 
endeavour in the world of man. Although hope is not a new 
idea and it is not uncommon to hear people express hope in 
their conversations, there remain ©any for whom the reality 
of hope ©ay constitute a new experience. A better under* 
standing of the meaning of hope may lead to greater oppor-
tunities for experiencing hope. 
It is my preference to forego the task of providing 
a preliminary definition of hope. It would be inappropriate 
and unfair to the reader if a definition of hope was pro* 
vided at this point. Mo simple or single definition could 
adequately encompass the range of meanings that arise in the 
present analysis of different contexts and varied levels of 
abstraction. Furthermore, an initial definition might only 
curtail the reader's involvement and the development of his 
own understanding of hope as he reads what follows, evalu-
ates it, and relates it to his own experience. 
It will be helpful, however, to depict the general 
areas to be considered in the present analysis of hope. 
Some of the perspectives of the historical treatment of hope 
are especially relevant to an adequate formulation of hu»an 
hope, and will provide at starting point for this paper* 
These perspectives will emphasize man's appreciation or non* 
appreciation of hope &n& the reasons he has offered for 
these viewpoints. This will be followed by a presentation 
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of ideas about hope in theological and other contemporary 
contexts* 
There is an obvious distinction between these con* 
ceptunl perspectives and the phenomenon of nope as an indi* 
vidual experiences it or is thought to experience it. The 
latter part of this paper will attend primarily to what is 
known about the meaning of hope in phenomenalogical teras. 
The present formulation of hope may thus be under* 
stood to encompass (a) a picture of the content of hope and 
its conceptual application in historical and contemporary 
milieux, and (b) the phenomenon or experience of hope. This 
breakdown is intended to emphasise the important point that 
ideas about the content and concept of hope do not necessar-
ily describe the personal experience of hope. The present 
analysis will attend to each of these aspects of hope. It 
is appropriately entitled "Hopes A General Meaning Analy* 
sis«w 
The question of the relationship of human hopes and 
human deeds is especially intriguing in itself. I have 
already pointed to the observation that hunan hopes and 
human actions are often conflicting, but this relationship 
is obviously aore complex.' The ambiguity surrounding this 
relationship is particularly interesting since the future of 
mankind ultimately depends on both his hopes and his 
actions, not as they conflict, but as each supports the 
other. This issue will be treated as a sub-theae. 
Some Perceptions of the Value of Hope 
A sampling of our literary heritage suggests that 
hope and hoping have been issues of concern to writers from 
aany literary eras. The perspectives that arise in this 
cursory review point to an awareness of the reality of huoan 
hope, a reality that is viewed as having questionable »@rlts« 
Specifically, there is a great deal of ambivalence associ-
ated with the value of human hope and hoping. The following 
review exemplifies this issue. 
Virtually all early Greek writers provided a concept 
of hope that reflected a prevailing philosophy of life. The 
nature of elois, the Greek word for hope, was generally a 
result of the perspective the Greeks held toward life and 
religion. Nevertheless, the early Greek writers expressed 
different opinions regarding the value of hop© and hoping. 
This was a reflection of changes in life philosophy and cer* 
tain individual impressions of hope {Williams, 1927). 
The elpis of Greek literature was etymoiogically 
connected with voluntas. the Latin word for pleasure, and 
hope had the meaning of a pleasurable affective state. How-
ever, this meaning was not evident in the early writings of 
Homer and Pindar where hoping was understood only in the 
loose sense of 'expect* or 'suppose.' This latter meaning 
was short-lived and replaced by *to desire confidently, 
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often at one's awn cost.* These different meanings can be 
understood in the context of Greek religious beliefs In 
early times (tfilliaa*, 1927), 
Olympian theolog/ SKphasized the superiority of the 
fteltia* #vtr n®rtal*» tholx capacity far Jaalaiisy and envy* 
And their vengeful actions directed at ©en. Punishment by 
the Gads was attributed to either the strivings of man to 
liken thaautalvoa to tha Oada by attaining material prospar* 
ityf or tfeo iasalafta* #nd tin that aeeanpanied prosperity. 
As usatarlnl fains aceruad aon war* provided tha hop* of fur* 
tha* awe«#saas only t* ha thwarted by tha vonfoful actions 
©f tha God** 
It was this frustration of ft***** hapaa that provided 
hope with a some-vlu t sinister meaning and lad Hesiod to 
writ* of it m an ovil that hal«mt*d to tha mm claas of 
event* a* death ana diseases that cause havoc among mankind. 
Thi* viewpoint waa avldaiiaed In tha writing* of Mamert 
Theognis, Pindar, Bacchylides, Herodutus, and Prometheus, 
and clearly aiepra&aad by Aeschylus in tha Agamemnon: 
Tha great gad* hoard our cause, and in ana mood 
ising, in tha wm of bitter blood, 
t san should shriek and dla and toners should burn, 
Cast thair fraat vatai wbil* aver t&ersy** urn 
Hap* waved her empty hand** and nothing fall 
tin William** p. 2133. 
At tha same time not all writers war* blind to tha possibil-
ity of a favourable hope. Theognis stated in hi* elegies: 
El pis is tha only food dalty laft to saaas tha 
others have forsaken them, and fan* to Olympus. 
ffi 
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Faith, Teaiperance, have gone. The graces have left 
the earth. No longer are just oaths observed among 
taen, nor does anyone reverence the imiaortal gods. 
. . . But as long as man lives and beholds the light 
of the sun, let him worship the gods and wait upon 
Hope. Let him pray to the gods, and, as he burns 
goodly thighs, let him sacrifice first m& last to 
Hope [in Williams, pp. 209-210]. 
Sophocles also acknowledged a good hope, but recognized a 
danger in the activity of hoping; 
For that far-roving Hope, though many men have com-
fort of her, to many is a Delusion that wings the 
dreams of Desire: and he whoa she haunts knows 
nothing till he burn his foot against hot fire [in 
Williams, p. 213}. 
This passage indicates that Sophocles saw hope as a source 
of gratification, but also saw the element of delusion in 
hope, leading saan away froa reality and resulting in his 
disappointment and destruction. 
The writings of Euripides and Thucydides brought the 
awareness of a transition in religious outlook and the 
beginning of a change in the outlook on hope. This change 
continued under the influence ©f Orphisit and the spread of 
the Oionysiac and Pythagorean cults in the next century. 
These religious movements held that God was a deified man, 
and with this breakdown in the barrier between deity and 
men, elpis was no longer viewed as a curse to human striv-
ings. Plato and Socrates emphasized the divine origin ©f 
the soul and the belief that roan was good by nature* With 
their view of a good God and a generally optimistic view of 
life there was a favourable use of the word hope. This view 
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of hope evolved further in the writings of St. Paul. In 
Pauline theosophy the Christian was considered a child of 
God, and was expected to look forward to eternal happiness. 
He had every reason to hope (Williams, 1927). 
The poetry of wore recent times shows the persis-
tence of a favourable orientation toward hope and hoping. 
Samuel Johnson stated: "where there is no hope there can be 
no endeavor [in Menninger, 1959, p. 483 j.w Emerson wrote: 
"it is by hope that we judge a man's wisdom [in Menninger, 
p. 483]"} Bliss Carmen: uAn open hand, an easy shoe, And a 
hope to make the day go through [in Bartiett, 1953, p. 63] B; 
Robert Bridges: Mi live on hope ^nd that 1 think do all who 
come into this world [in Bartiett, p. 37 j M; William Shake-
speare: "True hope is swift, and flies with swallow's 
wings; Kings it makes Gods, and meaner creatures kings [in 
Bartiett, p. 346J." 
Others have maintained the pessimistic position held 
by the early Greeks. For example, Shelley wrote: "Worse 
than despair, worse than the bitterness of death is hope [in 
Menninger, p. 483]w; and Nietzsche: wHope is the worst of 
evils, for it prolongs the torment ©f man [in Menninger, 
p. 483]." 
The pessimism surrounding the idea of hope ©ay be 
given several interpretations according to the different 
contexts in which hope has been considered. The early Greek 
conception of hope as a state of negative affairs can be 
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attributed to their fatalism regarding the course of life 
events (Menninger, 1959). Man's lot was determined accord-
ing to the whims of a deity who consciously and successfully 
opposed the actions and desires of men. There was a preva-
lent feeling that all events were predetermined by the deity 
and, should man hope, he had no reason to expect to see his 
hope fulfilled. According to Metz (1963) the world of the 
Greeks appeared as a consistent ^nd closed cosmos. 
The more recent pessimism concerning hope seems to 
be associated with a more complex attitudinal configuration. 
It is linked to two profound questions raised by secular 
existentialists: "Can there be a moral order for man of the 
twentieth century?*1 and from this "Can human existence be 
meaningful?" Precipitated in part by the intellectual 
awareness that God might be merely a projection of man,s 
mind, the thought quickly followed that without a God there 
could be no right or wrong, there could be no moral process 
with which man could identify and upon which he could base 
his life activity* The question was: "Could there be a 
moral order without God?M We can imagine the pain and suf-
fering of those who, steadfast in their belief in a God, 
were forced to examine this possibility* in a world where 
there was no reality of good or evil, where there was no 
reason to value one event over another, it was thought that 
there could be no reason to hope (Evans, 1971), Hope was 
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considered an alien in a world without morality, a world 
where all was permitted to man. 
The question of a moral reality was intimately tied 
to the issue of meaning in the lives of men. If there was 
no reason for morality and all things were perceived as 
having equal or neutral value, then life presented itself as 
nothing more than a series of meaningless events. From this 
perspective, man*s ability to make choices was seen as irre-
levant* And, as hope expressed a conscious tendency toward 
a particular state of affairs, it was considered an absurd-
ity in a world of total and encompassing meaninglessness 
(Evans, 1971). 
It is important to recognize that the intellectual 
perspective that denies morality, meaning, and the value of 
hope is not, in itself, sufficient grounds to deny the 
experience of hope. One cannot assume that individual 
preferences die even in a world which is 'thought* to be 
meaningless. As long as one desires a particular state of 
affairs, he may have grounds for hoping that the state of 
affairs will be realized. Even those who accept the intel-
lectual denial of meaning may have desires for a different 
and meaningful life and experience this hope. 
Although the fatalism of the Greeks and the despair 
over morality and meaning in the twentieth century are not 
sufficient grounds to deny the experience of hope, both 
attltudinal frameworks deny the value in hope. It is both 
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necessary and helpful to question whether those who depreci-
ated existence first experienced it as meaningless, or on 
the basis of the idea that life is meaningless, then found 
it so, T© some extent the idea that life was meaningless 
may have precluded the possibility of finding or being 
receptive to meanings. In this sense, an attitude of mean-
inglessness is distinguished by its functional impoverish-
ment. 
This issue is particularly significant in the pres-
ent context since it points to the realization that atti-
tudes toward life may curtail thoughts about hope, and may 
even preclude the experience of hope. This issue is 
extremely relevant to the life of twentieth-century man 
whose exposure to existential pessimism would seem to have 
been both intensive and extensive. The essence of this 
point of view was aptly expressed in Romans IV. 18. s *»flho 
against hope believed in hope?** ^ e may take this a step ^  *" {r*£* 
further and ask Mlfi?ho against hope experienced hope?** 
Even though there are sufficient reasons to take the 
idea of hope seriously and attempt to understand its meaning 
more fully, we may expect that there will always be those 
who either deny the value of hope or describe hope as a pro-
jection or a fabrication of man's mind, and relegate it to 
the category of an 'opiate of the people.* In response to 
those who do see hope this way, it is only necessary to 
point out that many value hope as a phenomenal reality and, 
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for this reason, it warrants our attention and understand-
ing. 
It is obvious, as well, that hope is surviving the 
attack that negates its value. It may even be the case that 
contemporary concern for hope has been fostered by its 
previous depreciation. There are those who see hope or 
would like to see it in the world, those who believe in 
hope, and those who have experienced hope. It is the 
author's feeling that hope is a positive reality. The fol-
lowing section acknowledges this reality and describes one 
context in v>/hieh contemporary man is describing a role for 
hope. 
Selected Aspects of a Theology of Hope 
Man's hopes burst open his present, connect 
him with his past, drive him toward the horizons of 
a yet unrealized future [Braaten, 1968, p. 97j. 
The hope school of thought has bmn organized by those 
theologians who have looked beyond dogmatic constraints in 
an attempt to clarify man's existential position and his 
potential for becoming other than what he has bmen in the 
past. This represents a radical departure from some forms 
of traditional theology and a movement toward an alternate, 
more accurate, and more complete picture of the human being 
as an 'eschatological being'—one who is future oriented. 
Hope theologians do not discard the past and present in 
favour of the future. Importance is placed on the future as 
it relates to the past and present. It is the synthetic 
conception of these temporalities that marks the activity of 
the hope school as a significant movement. 
The theology of hope is grounded in the recognition 
that change is the substratum of all human experience, 
"More radically than earlier generations we know that we 
live in history where everything changes and nothing remains 
in its place [Moltman, 1970, p. 102].w In like manner, 
The author recognises that there are many different 
theological perspectives on hope, and further, there may be 
more than one 'hope school.* The present analysis, however, 
is limited to aspects of the hope school of theology that 
has been described in Capps (1970) and in Marty and Peerraan 
(1968). 
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aioch (1970) paint* out that reality 1* a category which is 
exposed ta flexibility and obligated to change. This view 
was expressed differently by Lawler (1963): MThe only abso-
lute truth 1* that there la no absolute truth . . . [p. 183].M 
earlier theological thought. This orientation may have many 
positive implications far a mm theology and tha practice of 
* flaw religion. 
on It In some theological circles seems to have evolved fro*a 
tha ground lovel of experience, that 1* froai man's experi-
ence of himself and others &® tha real world. The hope 
theology is distinguished by tha fact that It focuses an man 
in relation to hi* worldly future, rather than mm striving 
far ath*r^«irJ414ii»«#. Novak fltaf) paint* out tha thaalagy 
of hope 4* growing out of man's experience in tha world, 
that 1* hi* experience of change. 
Tha historical dialogue between Marxists and Chris-
a^avaoiPwMa' ^•^^MM-nRjpp^ite'iwas w w w mt9*mmf ^p<o)i*sp'aa'aF~apafi*a»'fliB*** *>^a&aiRas# ,^a mtmm^^mFWm^^jKx 'ipyaaBt »* B ^ ^ W , ^ * ^ B ^ B -
It* activity on dogma to mm concerned with the dynamics of 
organized Christian religion as the consolation and justifi-
cation of tha status quo: 
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Religion is the illusory realisation of man's 
essence because man's essence possesses no genuine 
reality . . . . Religious suffering is at once an 
expression of man's real suffering and a protest 
against that suffering, but it is the latter only in 
the same way that the Chinese coolie reaches for his 
opium pipe, it is the opium of the people [in 
Calian, 1969, p. 434]. 
Marx recognized Christian dependency on a creator 
and that Christian hope was contingent on the belief of a 
promised and better life to be provided by the Deity. Marx 
viewed this form of dependence as antithetical to full human 
development and autonomy. The Christian form of transcend-
ence was other-worldly. He proclaimed a new heaven, but 
forgot about a new earth. In contrast, the Marxist longed 
for the humanisation of man by man and not through idle wor-
ship in a God who may or may not exist. While the Christian 
was content to hope through his beliefs, the Marxist looked 
to a worldly future and placed his hope in man (Calian, 
1969). 
Theologians of the hope school work with tha aware-
ness that other-woridliness has b@m an obstacle to human 
progress, that the perpetuation of the heaven syndrome has 
served to keep men poor by reconciling them to their earthly 
poverty. In part, this awareness seems to have grown out of 
a closer identification of Marxist and Christian goals and 
the realization that secular man is now more unwilling to be 
inserted into a framework that is other-worldly. Marxists 
and some Christians agree that restriction of salvation to 
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the grave beyond implies the obviation of human hope. With 
the diminished importance of vertical transcendence and 
dependence on absolute theologisms, it becomes less possible 
to subordinate this world to some more permanent and more 
valued domain (Capps, 1970). This world no longer depends 
on another for its reality and significance, it depends on 
man. 
On this basis, the hope school determines to: 
. . . reduce the transcendent hopes of Christianity 
in order to bring them into life and an active 
alteration of the worldt it is able to stimulate 
that aspect of hope in Christ which is concerned 
with the changing of this world* The Christian hope 
for the justice and kingdom of God in Christ must 
enter into partnership with those who work for the 
economic relief of the "heavy laden," m4 who work 
politically for the freedom and dignity of man 
[Braaten, 1968, p. 107]. 
The theology associated with the school of hope attests t© a 
reality of objectively real possibility, and is directly 
oriented toward realizing possibilities that would benefit 
man. Among the hope theologians there is widespread accept-
ance of Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: "The philoso-
phers have merely interpreted the world in different ways? 
now, however, it is a matter of changing it [in Bloch, 1970, 
p. 61]." 
The recent and growing awareness that men have tha 
capacity to influence the direction of the evolutionary pro-
cess has led some hope theologians to posit a theology by 
design rather than by reaction to a given state of cultural 
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affairs. The hope school favours a stance where theoretical 
categories are to be supplanted by actional ones. The rela-
tionship to the future is viewed as operative, that is man 
will have access to the future he wants only through crea-
tive action (Capps, 1970), 
Hope theology argues that the novum cannot be 
reduced to a component within an already existing system. 
The future cannot be registered within schemas that are 
devised for what is. Theory cannot account for the future, 
nor can any interpretative explanatory conceptual scheme 
adequately take note of it* The theological form of coher-
ence in the past cannot represent that which is not-yet-
existent. In hope theology the contemplation of 'what is' 
is replaced by 'what ought to be,' and the emphasis is on 
'what form change shall take' rather than on the 'why' of 
past or existent states of affairs. Man is no longer 
exclusively concerned with 'what was,' but with a reality 
that has 'not yet been,' a reality that will come into being 
as a result of man's activity (Capps, 1970). 
The hope school is not concerned with restoration or 
with what has b®@n lost, but with the establishment of a 
reality that has not yet been. Moltmann (1969) points out 
that in the past "Christian faith was proclaimed not as 
exodus out of the bondage of the past and through the bound-
aries of the present into the freedom of a new future, but 
as a turning back to sacred sources [p. 104]." History or 
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the past ways of life were viewed as paradise lost, and sal-
vation meant that paradise was regained. In this frameworks 
hoping was equivalent to the mythical faith of remembering. 
Both the myth of eternal return and the hope for the return 
to the primordial state of man are still evidenced in con-
temporary contexts. In contrast to those who seek their 
futures In the past, hope theology turns to the reality of 
the yet unknown, and attempts to create in that unknown the 
possibility of a better future. The real contemplation of 
the novum replaces a turning to the past, and a new dimen-
sion of experience is recognized in which features of exis-
tence that had not been looked at before become prominent. 
With the recognition that there are no adequate prototypes 
for such a future, roan becomes the agent who will create and 
control history. 
We have seen that the theology of hope is designed 
to activate movement and energy in the present, W© may wall 
ask what other functions will the 'to do* theology take upon 
Itself. Theologians are aware of this question and point 
out that the task of hope theology is to determine anew the 
relationship between religion &n4 society, between the 
church :&nd social publicness, and between eschatological 
faith and life in society (Metz* 1970). Hope theology sug-
gests the growing awareness that the development of human 
beings is intimately entangled in the vicissitudes of soci-
ety, and theology must now interpret and understand 
1® 
existence as a social-political problem In its broadest 
sense. The theology of tha hope school will ha concerned 
with important issues la the lives of secular mm* There la 
hope that relates Christians to a worldly future. 
••asa apples5 afripas^pF^P w»sPpp^p w»*mp^P«fe«*rg|JF W P F aP?|s ^yPSra* IA^W^P^JR. apw? SR 
social theology. Some hapa theologians have interpreted tha 
withdrawal from society. 
The importance and the mil stent emphasis of modern 
theology am tha subjectivity of tha believer, on hit 
aaad to toy a posooaftl *Vo»* t® a*lw«tl*f*i k n w o M 
t w » tolvfttio* lata a pidvata faaiity» and iftlo 
tfeift tXOJWfOMMftltA Of OOlVOti** lata « p»i¥«ta »at* 
ter throuoh transcendental* oersonalistic or axis-
toMiftl f «ot*t*« «tt»t ho awoxooao thratifh tha wodt* 
ing out at a theology which we nave casr^ctorIzed 
with tha phmm *p«IItia«l» ihaalaw fttota, Xfii* 
Hope theology repudiates the benefits of tha privat-
ization of religion, and true salvation la associated with 
^gf ww*w*aw"^Ms»0i»^^w aa^Wtwjvaviav^in ^a»? flpHo^ok^Paisio? w^oyapoww a* a^Mh^P: ojwpsias^p if^ iFJflfca*asp w^ai ^*^ikaisaa jwp^ w 
expressed by Garaudy (1968): "The future of mankind cannot 
even without them . . . [p. 212]." Christian hop* la no 
ual, but that #f tha covenant, of tha peopie, ©f the many. 
tha church of tha theology of hope la viewed as a 
place where everysaan may articulate his hopes. 
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. . . the church will provide * . . the occasion and 
the place for vision, imagination* fantasy, and 
Utopian thought. It should be a place in which one 
can really imagine the kind of society, city, univer-
sity, family, or a world quite different from the 
way it is now [Cox, 1970, p. 135]. 
As Capps (1970) points out, the hope theology recommends a 
movement from logos to mythos. This is similar to Bloch's 
(1970) notion that the future is accessible through day-
dreaming and imagining, that is through activities which 
have always been a part of the mythological approach. As 
myths are elements in which the future can be represented, 
the mythologizing of the hope school will take the form of 
pro-mythology which is creative and pushes ahead to include 
the novum. 
The church will also provide a basis for criticism 
and reform in the present. The future is conceived not only 
in terms of projection, but also in the context of present 
sufferings. Through the awareness and experience of present 
miseries &n4 the criticism of the conditions that support 
these miseries, man engages in the process of seeking a bet-
ter future. Christian messianism gives the church a criti-
cal perspective and loads it with the potential to act and 
change present suffering. Novak (1968) describes the role 
of the church as that of being able to question on the basis 
of a projected future? 
. . . a merely projected future is limited and does 
not represent the complete realization of historical 
possibility. Man is gifted with an imagination and 
a skeptical attitude which makes it possible for him 
tQ
 AUottL**1* conditions of tha future, to change tha 
wi^rld. "Cfflfm#ifflBatttly» the hwaa aniswil wtra®ad#nda* w?m® MM OM» empirical projections; ha cal ls than 
l a t a question [p . 2GSj. 
Tha power of tha past that addresses the present 
from the position of burdensome authority l a broken fey hope 
that 4mtm tha future Into tha sufferings of tha present. 
Freedom from tha past does not mean tha t the past l a fan* 
gotten. Ths past leads to the future and tha appropriation 
of fcopofftil tontfoaelo* fso* tha paot fcolp* t o tfoftea f«&«*• 
aai9t4tt$t# 
Sitwia tha oatofoxy #€ *what ovo£t to ha» sveotvoo 
special emphasis l a hope theology, I t would seem that tha 
oeaning of hope cm ha related to issues of morality. 
Through the processes of c r i t i c iz ing the present and Imagin-
ing future content mm «*y involve himself in aoral decision-
making fry which certain end-states and actions t o a t ta in 
thaaa o«oVot«too xooofcro aoErol J»atif i aa t l an . Hiatal «**• i t 
may be aaid that the hopes af m a or, more praeisaly, tha 
content a t hope can ha a reflection of man's moral decisions. 
i t wamld h® inftot«ootf JM»JOV«99 t o aaa a l l feapaa tfcio way* 
Ao R*n haa tha capacity to saake moral decisions &nd act upon 
theee, likewise ha haa the capacity to be amoral, immoral, 
w&fm&imm aia'^ »i4fe^ww— w 0"w*aoaowpp'waN^f«ap'w*w a^a*ww afraaatwaFaaaaap* iPtO> aowa^ff ^a'aKjSF'^ w^iia awaaais mm^s^w 
actions ta attain that content are not always based on moral 
decisions. However, to the extent that man's hopes are 
based an tha crlticisa of existing atataa #f affair* and tha 
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identif ication of 'what ought to be' or a taorally desirable 
at a^asaso)****•?jp w^ap* i f ^aaaMw^a™ ap*Wf^ wwio ^HPIB^XI a* a w w w w sa^ff^i^,apap«^^iFa*a^^^wawsajiMS$w*sp T*'^wa*a w 1 ™ 
understood a* a process that leads to hope. This suggests 
that hope say occur as a function of man's ability to itiake 
tion for aoral decislon-saaking. 
fha importance placed on the concept of futurity and 
'what aught to ha* goes hand-In-hand with a aotflflostto* la 
gxoto* 1* tiwt livoo of froUoaanm (ftoaaxt* 1*4S)* «Mt that It 
— w i p w afo# sp^waa °f* w wiw»«aa*p*w» "WFIUHUS ^WPW^W*^p»a!r ,wy>»,iap»*** —'Tsra^p »r ^ "PBRKtr w m* **&m& I P ^ W I W ^ S ^ * * ^PF-WC BR^JW 
{Lo*io*# 1968). The new Goo app*«r$ a t the po,/er of tha 
ftttonro to eautswdtef tha *ogoti¥0 aoMMtta of oxlotoaoo tha t 
we mm- experience, fha divini ty a t ©ad la seen m m dynam-
ise a t tha future brntrnm f»an and not above hiw, Tha subor-
dinates In the previous God-world polar i ty ar# reversed, and 
transcendence I s j^&ninaf ul lv related t o the r e a l i t i e s of 
t ina and change* 
Reality la now **eo to include that «hich haa not-
yet-coae-into-belng and aust ha realized. Understood as God 
ws*aso ^ w s B i ^ a ^ * ap^ pR™?1 % ^(P'Ofr sa f lo jaw a^^a^P w * ^ a ap'afr^F'awO'Mia^jK aa^^p " !^*>WE <*o*fl^ TiFSpp«fflNBFWs P^" m m& a^ *OHBF i i f c^s^ is^a 
wise am hlaaali. Sad becomes the one who© mm will be 
(Capps, 1970). hloch (1970) suggests that tha concept of 
becoming la in itself hope, and the process of becoming is 
hope fulfilled. Man la the focal point of hope In the 
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present and tha culaination of U f a in tha future. The 
himself a* ha mediates, directs, and effects the course of 
future and tha mmm by which tha future will be realized. 
Tha saspi'wisis on chang# 1 A tha position artlculatad 
paint* f ixott It wanid a**® that thmmm* 1* Itaalf * to not 
necessarily advantageous &nd, on mmm occasions, It i»y be 
mmmhmlMm ** **• mmmt that kmp% la aalipaad* te^t 1® 
iayoxtoAt* ho*o***v i««* tha point of *lo» that *** la aMa 
t® ooloet a daslimhle fwtww out «f tho iApradiaata of 
^hanga and act to bring ahaurt that f«t^ra« 1* this wayt 
man's hapaa can mmm a regulative function, inasmuch at 
they give direction to tha course at chaise mid tha actions 
Of *•** 
Tha theology at hops articulates a position for ©an 
1ft which ha la ahla ta i&agine and plaa his futur*, criti-
the intuit ha wontt* and oat to attain that fvftMto* Thaaa 
processes oro centrally involved $M his hapa fax- a better 
action, that is, on activities by which daalfahla change* 
are identified and sought after, it would sees that hope can 
ha basically umierstood as a fa®* of transcendence. M i 
m 
hoping mm be understood aa transcendence, and tha activi-
ti*a which precede hope aa transcending activities. In tha 
wore detailed consideration. 
There are striking similarities between nany aspects 
of hope theology and secular man's appraisal of the roi© of 
• w p i r w ' • ' * ' • Wiww^f*^Mi'jwjjFiia"a(|'^a*#" jp ^WJF&Wm*m^>fKi-^tr^a' * ' S * ^ ^ sw^^^a as* ^a,'W**^?,'w*sp*?a i m f i ^ w a a w W ' w O 
tha rol« of hope in tha lives of groups of people «feo mm 
^SP^W* ws wfc w *** WK j f ^wa*a^P"Wap i^ppaw «PRP*W *w&wsim%mm*BgWNm^^m awt#^^sBiwpjpi y » a^iai*a*«>a*v s» 
Applications of Hope in Some 
Contemporary Contexts 
The meaning of hope in this section is organically 
related to the for© and content of i»an*s activity in-the-
world# The changes he desires, his actions to effect 
change, and his reasons that indicate the possibility of 
change are all formative elements of the development of hop® 
in this context. The hopes we examine ara those of aggre-
gates of human beings, of societies and nations. Their 
hopes are described by individuals who have analyzed various 
social and political patterns of events, and have pointed to 
a position and a role for hope. 
Black America*s struggle toward independence is a 
striking example of the relationship between human hope and 
»anfs activity in-the-world. Qs, Martin Luther King*s 
(1%9) final published statement, entitled A, Testament, of 
Hope, will be considered here because it represents one of 
the better articulations of the heartfelt hopes of the Ameri-
can ifegro. Dr« King introduces his testament with the 
tae»orys 
. * • that only yesterday Negroes were not only 
grossly exploited but negated as human beings» They 
were invisible in their misery. But the suffering 
and silent slave of 110 years ago, an object of 
scorn at worst or of pity at best, is today*s angry 
man. He Is vibrantly on the move forcing change 
rather than waiting for it to happen [p. 174]. 
m 
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Dr. King contends that Negro agitation la causing 
America to examine al l of i ts interrelated Hmm since al l 
are esbodied 1A the lot of the Aaerican Negro. Violent 
omntlona and ^aval«£tia«»«y notion* fatca a faca*t#*f«sa 
eaufrantatiait with pavaftyt parajiniliiaf nilit**!*** and 
materialism, and aa aan* occasiona, those actions load to 
nooninffnl *IIOO***O*# Mnon vlolont «ptaaayal 1* fallawad hy 
something positive, when sorae aspect of tha treatment of 
ifagraaa in $faari«a la »«*avali»«tadt and nn*fiittttful nocturia** 
tlono coftttltt than tnoxo i t feapa for a nott** way of l i fo 
f oar tha anajeican Mwgm* 
tsm Riftf** onuronnctivo hapa wm eontinnont an tha 
anility of tho Mo*** to mm nlaooif aa hnving tho capacity 
to iNurtitlnot* IJI tha ontonninotion of Ma onn dootlny * Mia 
octiona* viniont aar mhmmkm* that lod t© *ono pooitiv* 
social reform, mm tha basis of his hop?. r'As long aa 
ip'sa w*^a*^p* " o a w^p^ s^ wpasp ™ araaawfjSj* a w ^ ^ ^ *^wi*'*wwTiP"!^piw apw?w! ™s a^^ mmmtimm™ii&m9H$^ SF s r a * w i p a , ' w ™ ™ *? 
Negroes were willing and able to press harder ma& work 
#w*jN*>^§a^Bj«n* flp»fffl# aaspjptoijr 9 ^ ^ ^ ^ •W^www^r %*w^wa<*3|p m&^rwiw^&wp t ,w*^pa^^ j | | ^ ,*s»^^*F^'p SFat idWPsp^jln* 
The- tepa «f the faerie an Negro nay thus be viewed la tno 
occur stand a$ reasons vshy the objects of his global hopes 
|a more equitable use of political power end a sharing of 
opportunitiea) nay be realized, ami are reasons that support 
a hopaful outlook fax the future. 
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Formulations that explain the actions of the Ameri-
can negro in terms of either 'striving to attain some iden-
tifiable goal* or 'learning to be aggressive* way be too 
simple or Incomplete. Serkowitz (1972) provided this criti-
cism of the more rational theories and pointed to frustra-
tions &nd other factors as »ore plausible explanations for 
tone of the aggressive actions of the American tfegr© during 
the last ten years. In Berkowits's terms frustration was 
understood to occur when one had been anticipating or expect-
ing a certain pleasurable state of affairs and then found 
that the object of his expectation could not be realized. 
Borfcowitx suggests that because the flegroes in the Northern 
States had experienced better living conditions than flegroes 
raised in the Southern States, the northerners had learned 
to hope for and expect many of the social goods that society 
can provide. However, these expectations were often 
thwarted, and the Northerners were actually more frustrated 
than their Southern counterparts. As a consequence, the 
Megroe© raised in the North were roore likely to initiate and 
take part in riots. 
BerkowitE also suggests that a person's sense of 
self-control is a laajor factor determining how he deals with 
his frustrations* Specifically, there are indications that 
a sense of personal efficacy leads to a greater willingness 
to initiate and maintain action as on® means of fighting 
frustrating conditions. With reference to the Aaerlean 
2? 
black h® states! wthis sense of personal control contri-
butes to their militancy, and enables thea to do something 
about their frustrations, if only to take violent action 
[p. 85]«B Other factors thought to account for so«® of the 
aggressive actions of the American Megro included the 
experience of painful stiaulation fro® the environment and 
situations where the Negro perceived himself unfavourably 
with respect to certain reference groups. 
Undoubtedly there are many situations in which the 
factors pointed to by JJerkowitz lead to Wegro agitation and 
action. Besides these interpretations it seems equally 
likely that on some occasions their actions were based on 
their conscious evaluation of situations in which they found 
themselves and their choice to change those situations. 
Their actions could be understood as the result of a moral 
decision and the courage to act upon that decision. 
Even though there are ©any different conditions that 
would see® to give rise to action, there is strong agreement 
with respect to the value of action as a basis of hope. 
Robert F. Kennedy viewed greater citizens1 participation as 
the only way to check the creeping corruption in America and 
foster hope for a better way of life, Arthur Schlesingar Jr. 
(1969), a friend to the late Senator, pointed out that 
"Robert Kennedy . * . evolved sort of a Christian stoicisa 
and existentialism that gave his both a fatalism about life 
and an understanding that man's destiny was to struggle 
m 
against his fate [p. 176].** In this struggle, Kennedy taw 
the actions of men, the actions of the poor, the oppressed, 
and the impoverished as the basis of the hope that they 
^ould become part of the mainstream of American life. For 
Robert F. Kennedy the future lay beyond the vision of men 
but not beyond tiieir ability to control it and influence its 
outcome. 
Man's acting to change his worldly status was a cen-
tral ingredient in the concept of hop® articulated by both 
Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King. Both roen acted in 
behalf of those who expressed the desire for a better way of 
life, and since that time, each has been looked upon as a 
martyr of that hope. Their activity symbolized and brought 
sustenance to the hope for a new America. 
Erich Froisa (1968) has championed the cause of hope 
in his ©ost recent attack on the technological society as 
the epitome of a social condition that negates all values of 
the humanistic tradition. He states that the tendency to 
install technical progress as the highest value has »ade man 
an appendage of the machine, dependent on it and submissive 
to it. Man's sense of alienation and his passiveness are 
the symptoms of his acceptance of the Technological Deity. 
He is passive, he does not relate to the world actively und 
is forced to submit to his idols and their demands. Prorata 
points to a widespread hopelessness with respect to man's 
feelings about being able to change the course of events in 
American life. 
The Revolution of Hope (1968), one of his latest 
works, is a major attempt to describe the means by which a 
hopeful outlook raay be instilled in the American people and 
the objects of hope may be realized. He sees violence and 
continued passivity as having no positive effectiveness, and 
specifies his hope for huiaanixation in terns of the follow-
ing activities: 
(1) planning which includes the system man and is based 
on norms which follow froia the examination of the 
optimal functioning of the human being? 
(2) activation of the individual by methods of grass 
roots activity and responsibility, by changing the 
present Methods of alienated bureaucracy into om of 
humanistic managements 
(3) changing the consumption pattern in the direction of 
consumption that contributes to activation and dis-
courages passivation! 
(4) the emergence of new forms of psycho-spiritual orien-
tation and devotion, which are equivalents of reli-
gious systems of the past. 
Clearly, Promt sees hope in terms of the positive 
actions of men, where such actions »ake use of all available 
resources to rebuild the system. He attests to a consis-
tency of weans md ends, i.e., positive actions leading to 
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positive outcomes. Froraio's position is based on Albert 
Schweitzer's idea of 'reverence for life' which ©ay be 
understood to mean that those conditions that help ©an 
satisfy his needs and realize his potential in a positive 
sense are valued and sought after* 
Froiasi depicts the meaning of hope in the context of 
a planning process that is designed to bring about the 
hoped-for changes. Besides man's potential to act and 
assert himself, hope depends on the real possibility of 
change in the system. In Frotan's terras a real possibility 
of change means that there are psychological, economic, 
social and cultural factors which can be demonstrated—if 
not in their quantity, at least in their existence—as a 
basis for a possibility of change. Froam's model of hope 
points to the necessity of reasons that suggest that the 
changes implied in one's hopes are possible. Frota this 
point he has developed a plan that will lead man to realize 
the global objects of his hopes. The creation of this plan 
is itself an additional reason which supports the possibil-
ity that hope's objects will be realized and, further, it is 
a reason to adopt a hopeful orientation toward the future. 
The perspectives provided by Martin Luther King, 
Robert F. Kennedy, and Erich Froram attest to a similar 
understanding of hop©. Their hope for a better way of life 
encompasses freedom, equal and better opportunities for all, 
and greater participation. These are the global objects of 
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their hopes. Since greater participation is one of these 
objects, the relationship between man's actions and hope is 
especially interesting* Besides leading to a hopeful out-
look, the actions of men also represent a partial realiz-
ation of hope's global object, that is the actions of men 
are exemplars of the hoped-for greater participation in 
American life. As incidents of the object of hope, they are 
reasons (in the sense of direct and unequivocal evidence) 
that the global hope may be realized. The changes resulting 
from actions (as for example the changes in the treatment of 
the American Megro) are additional reasons to hope for the 
global objects such as an equal sharing of political power 
and opportunities to lead better lives. At exemplars of a 
global object of hope, these reasons also take the form of 
direct evidence. 
The present picture of hope deserves some qualifica-
tion. Hope has been described in situations where people 
are striving to attain identifiable goals. In this context 
the nature of hope is closely allied with a well articulated 
social-organizational process in which man acts to attain 
his goals, identifies reasons why those goals are attain-
able, as well as a rationale for how they may be obtained. 
At this level of conceptualization man's actions and reasons 
determine the meaning of hope and provide the basis for a 
hopeful outlook for the future. They are, as wall, the 
means by which the contents of the hoped-for future will be 
m 
realized. This view of hope is consistent with the picture 
of twentieth-century man provided by the hope school of 
theology and many other contemporary characterizations of 
man's ability to plan, act upon his world, and so determine 
his future. 
The foregoing examples represent only a small frac-
tion of instances where the concept hope has bmn applied in 
contemporary social contexts. To the best of the author's 
knowledge there is a consistent orientation toward an idea 
of hope that is based on action and reasons. Furthermore, 
there is a strong similarity between these conceptualiz-
ations of hope and the psychological treatment of expecta-
tion described by Toiman (1948), Rotter (1954), and Atkinson 
(1964). A precise formulation of hope in terms of expecta-
tion has been provided by Stotland (1969) who defines hope 
as 'an expectation greater than 0 of achieving a goal.* The 
degree of hopefulness, then, is the level of this expecta-
tion or the person's perceived probability of achieving a 
particular goal. 
Stotland (1969) provides considerable evidence to 
support his theory that individuals develop hopeful scheaas 
(cognitive frameworks) regarding the efficacy of their own 
actions to attain identifiable goals. Hopeful schemas are 
invoked as the result of an individual perceiving an event 
or events similar to a concept of the schema or by the 
individual's receiving a communication from another directing 
m 
him to Invoke the schema. The probability that the hopeful 
schema will be invoked and remain mmmmd la thought to be a 
poaitive function of (a) the number of times It haa naait 
invoko* p*avta»aly# in) tno awanar of avanta pra¥i#miy par-* 
ceived mm consistent with the schema, and (c) the importance 
of the p9m*mt If amy* who directs the individual to invoke 
the schema. Tte process of arousing and maintaining a hope-
ful schetaa itapiies that the Individual have some rational 
basis to da aa* That is, on the oasis of bit oxperience he 
identifies reasons that support a hopeful schema about M a 
ability to attain a certain goal. 
Thaaa reasons nay xofar to aa«pairla**aaa unono M a own 
actions iiava hmmm effective 1» attaining goals. In other 
v*ords, an individual nay become nop etui about attaining a 
awaiNn t^awi**** ^jjp^^^n*fc W P V a^a*^* aw^p^>a'#a^iv ^SPO** i*aa,*ap <fc'W'S*^P''aPwa«awa*o •aw^^n» w- a*jo>,pF ^pwaa* 
actions have been effective In attaining goals in the past. 
From Stotland's treatment of hope in terms of expectation 
It la easy to understand why actions and reasons were viewed 
described by Martin Luther King, Robert F, Kennedy, and 
Erich Frotaa. 
The present meaning m§ hop* would seem to no related 
to White's (1959J notion of 'competence,' which nay be 
understood aa an individual's sense of being able to effect, 
control* and cop© with M a environment. An individual's 
hopefulness (expectation) about his ability to achieve 
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certain goals nay be based aa tela sense of competence which, 
in turn, la the result of the success of hit actions to 
attain goals in previous situations. Farber (in Lester it 
Lester, If71) has suggested tnat an individual's hopefulness 
about U f a will increase or* decrease aa a function of 
swpwvsa1** ^ panSw^n** O*P*KH* an^n^<£,nj^*^**^^^ap -*••#a #**#Bf<pP mt?'mpmwmF*m *PO> * ' P P M I * ™ feawiTm n n p j * sa**a 
« p * # m i # i a «a>^ 8pT8^ R<*fc "sP 4as<*t<* aa ^^*spwa'*asa> s<Ma*aiwa™B asfapj^p nppaafe^^^iw^^^aa^p^a^p ns an^naFMp>^P*ManOP *n>aa 
his sense ef competence and his hopefulness will result. 
Farber suggests that If the threatening conditions are suf-
ficiently otxono, than tno jrooultina 1*** i* eanpatattea ®w£ 
aopefulne&s will be accompanied % an increase in the prate* 
iillity of awialda. 
The development of hopeful expectations on tho basis 
of man's actions can be easily Integrated with tha concept 
of reinforcement. More specifically, when an organism's 
actions are reinforced by the attainment of some goal, ha 
then tea a basis far the hope (expectation) tnat he will be 
able to attain other goals in future situations. In this 
way, an Individual's hopes can be viewed aa a function of 
positive reinforcement. There are nany utilitarian Implica-
tions to this view at the conditions that load to hope, but, 
obviously, tha application of positive reinforcement would 
nave to be adapted to the specific characteristics of pair* 
ticular situation*. 
Tha relation of positive reinforcement to hope baa 
bmm® considered from another point of view. tSawraae (1960) 
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described the process of learning in terms of tha organism's 
learning to hope air, more specifically, learning that a 
particular event signals oncoming reinforcement. He argued 
that hope la a prerequisite far action, oimiiarly, Stotland 
(1968) saw hope aa & basis for action, and cited evidence 
from studies 1 A instrumental learning to support this hypo-
thesis. He tdastifiad hapa aa a oonttsnct union km notit** 
tiofi*! onopoxtioo* onon. that 9*o*to* anpaetatiaw nf on*l 
attainment would lead to (a) more thought about how to 
attain tha $o*l9 and {») non* aalaetlva *ttonti*n t* connoto 
nf tho onrtvoanont colovant to nttolninf tha tool* A * hap® 
ooon* to aceur aa a function nf m * f a action** it *»*tid *l*n 
seem tnot *otion noon** on a fnttotion of no*** 
anpaatatian ahawt tha off t«o*y of M a mm notion* t® attain 
« ooatain tool t*pr«a#«t» a oin§*i** and aafNtnially f*onion» 
thio viow of hapa thono it an *ito*not* parapaatlira that la 
§»ntid»d In phenomenology, and will be treated at length In 
tha following saetlaa* 
A Phanomenological Analysis 
Preliminary fijayif,icaUon .of Terms— 
Hope, Opf^mfSff, and Wishing 
Prusyer (1963) indicated that hope has been used as 
a wastebasket term* and often confused with wishing or 
optimism. A blurring of the meaning of either or both terms 
has occurred where hope has been used interchangeably with 
wishing or optimism. Few writers have attempted to distin-
guish hope from wishing or optimism, and where clarification 
has been attempted, there are frequently different distinc-
tions. A survey of some of these differences of opinion 
will be helpful in arriving at a clearer understanding of 
the phenomenonogieal nature of hope and hoping. 
The difference between hope and optimism seems to be 
more clear-cut and subject to greater agreement than the 
difference between hope and wishing. Before identifying the 
former distinction it may be helpful to examine the posi-
tions of those who have viewed hope in terms that would seem 
more appropriate to a definition of optimism* 
Max Hammer (1970) saw hope as a camouflage for the 
apperception of what really exists in the world. 
W® are encouraging a pathological process when wa 
encourage a person to reject &nd deny the raality of 
what Jjt and instead encourage him to pursue what 
ought to be. And this is exactly what hope does 
tp> 153. 
Hammer thought that there is the inherent suggestion in hope 
m 
m 
that light will come even if it involves circumventing the 
darkness of despair. He concluded that there can be no 
legitimate role for hope in the process of psychotherapy* 
With his dismissal of hope, he also discarded the value of a 
future time perspective in psychotherapy, an omission that 
is both psychologically and philosophically unsound, and one 
that few psychotherapists would be likely to make. 
Waterman (1970) described the state of excessive or 
blind optimism in terms of unbounded hopefulness. This form 
of hope was said to occur when one person is extremely 
optimistic about another's situation and tries to cheer him 
or pressure him to likewise be optimistic. This hope is 
expressed as a way of avoiding conflict, maintaining the 
status quo, and feeling secure in ongoing relationships even 
though they may really be unsatisfactory. The expressions 
of this form of hope lead to a hopeless situation because no 
real change in relationship is possible* 
. . * certain expressions of hopefulness become 
stereotyped and are repeated in the same form much 
as a record that plays over and over again for 
hundreds or thousands of times. The response to the 
hopeful statement is also repeated with little vari-
ation. Mo new information is given and nothing 
changes [p. 45]» 
Waterman appropriately called this form of hoping *a Poilyana 
Ritual.* 
Others have expressed the view that hoping implies 
the rejection of reality. Menninger (1959) pointed out that 
some have seen hope as a counter-phobic denial of the horror 
3* 
and despair born of self-destructive trends or the imminence 
of existential doom. Similarly, Aronov (1970) ascribed the 
role of a defence to hope. More specifically, hope was seen 
as a means by which a child defends against painful feelings 
related to a very uncomfortable life situation. 
. . . the child's fantasy is that things will be 
better when he*s older, as he will be able to do 
things now forbidden to him but allowed older sib-
lings, or he will be allowed freedoms allowed to 
older children generally [p. 43], 
Aronov describes this type of hoping as basically only a 
flight into the future, an escape from living with the reali-
ties of the present. This form of hope is again consistent 
with the idea that in hoping one rejects a portion of reality. 
It is interesting to note that those who have 
attempted to describe the activity of hoping more precisely 
have made the degree of reality contact that which princi-
pally distinguishes hoping from optimism. Marcel (1965) 
understood the optimist as one who takes a position some 
distance from reality so that certain obstacles that previ-
ously seemed insurmountable then seemed attenuated. Keen 
(1963) suggested that optimism is based on illusion—in the 
Freudian sense—in that it arises out of a drive for wish 
fulfillment which ignores evidence to the contrary. Optim-
ism seems to imply the selective perception of reality, the 
ignoring or denying part of reality because the facts would 
force an interpretation that the optimist v^ ouid not want to 
make* 
m 
In contrast, hoping has been identified with pre-
cisely those situations where one accepts all the evidence, 
good or bad, that relates to the possibility that one's hope 
will be realized. The experience of hope is thought to 
acknowledge a plurality of facts, including those aspects of 
reality that are not conducive to the realization of one*s 
hope. It is this acceptance of reality that is supposed to 
provide the basis for hope (Fromm, 1968$ Marcel, 1965; 
Wenninger, 1959; Prusyer, 1963). This distinction between 
hope and optimism is accepted here and will be subject to 
further elaboration in the course of the development of the 
phenomenal nature of hope. This elaboration will consist in 
a more detailed analysis of the reality encompassed in the 
experience of hope. 
Hoping has also been defined in terms of the activ-
ity of wishing. For example, French (in Prusyer, 1963) 
identified hope as wishes for something and Menninger (1959) 
described hope as the consciousness of a realizable wish. 
Others have provided distinctions between these terras. For 
example, while French ascribed the activity of hoping to 
circumscribed goals (specific objects), Marcel saw wishing 
in terms of certain specific objects, but not hope, For 
Marcel, hope was supposed to refer to global objects alone, 
to states such as freedbm, justice, and salvation. 
While there is. a difference between specific and 
global objects, it is also the case that where one hopes for 
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a global object he may be able to describe some of the par-
ticulars encompassed by that object. Limiting hopefs 
objects to global states may well be a function of Marcelfs 
metaphysical orientation and the close association of hope 
with theological contexts for which there has been no con-
cretize tion. But man does express his hope in both concrete 
and abstract terms. The object level distinction may not be 
the best way to differentiate hoping from wishing. This 
does not deny the value of a metaphysical approach to or 
understanding of hope* It does seem to point, however, to 
the possibility that as there are many meanings of hope, 
there may also be different forms of the experience we call 
•hope.' 
Marcel further distinguished wishing from hope on 
the basis that wishing is closely associated with an urge 
toward tension discharge while hoping is not. He thought 
that wishing was followed by action, internal (as in halluc-
inating) or external (as in motor behaviour). In contrast, 
hoping was viewed as a state that Is connected with patience, 
forebearance, waiting and awaiting; and not with action, but 
with receptivity. 
An alternate distinction has bmn provided by 
Prusyer (1963) who suggested that wishing leads to magic, 
while in hope the magical elements are replaced by reality 
testing. He states: "It [hope] presupposes that a person 
have maximal orientation to all aspects of his . . . 
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situation, including the barriers and obstacles he finds 
. , , [pp. 91-92].H This difference between hoping and 
wishing, of course, is the same distinction that has been 
drawn between hope and optimism. 
In drawing distinctions between hoping, wishing and 
optimism, sometimes there is a tendency to see one activity 
precluding the possibility of others. It is realistically 
possible that a particular individual will hope for, wish 
for, and be optimistic about a certain state of affairs. On 
the basis of the degree of reality contact one might think 
that wishing and optimism could precede hoping, and lead to 
hope as more of reality was encompassed; or, the shattering 
of hope might be followed by a form of resigned optimism. 
If wishing and hope or hope and optimism occur in close tem-
poral relationship, it might be said that either pair form 
an experiential complex. Lynch (1965), for example, 
attested to this view and saw in hope the element of wishing 
itself. 
The recognition that wishing and hoping may occur as 
a complex is important from the point of view that in trying 
to understand one concept (hope) more clearly, one may tend 
to over-isolate it from similar concepts (wishing, optimism). 
It remains, however, that human experience is not always as 
fractionated as we might like to think, or as our thinking 
allows us to make if. Although the present analysis accepts 
the general distinction that in hoping one is in closer 
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contact with reality than in wishing and optimism, it also 
recognizes that wishing and optimism may be important ele-
ments in the experience of hope. 
It is the author's preference at this time, however, 
to delve more deeply into other aspects of the experience of 
hope. It is clear that the thoughts and experiences of some 
individuals have led them to ascribe to hope a variety of 
features that constitute the phenomenal reality to which 
'hope' refers. The following sections examine that reality. 
Despair and Hopelessness 
The many forms of the experience of darkness may be 
thought to include exhaustion, despondency, depression and 
demoralization (Harper, 1968). Although the alternatives to 
hope may be any of these, despair »nd hopelessness are 
thought to be the most intimate companions of hope. First, 
there is a theoretical connection between these concepts 
since despair and hopelessness are thought to point to some 
of the qualities of hopefulness. Second, there is an experi-
ential connection since hopelessness and despair are often 
viewed as antecedent conditions to the experience of hope. 
Fromm (1968) identified some of the behavioural con-
sequences of hopelessness at the social level of function. 
As examples, he points to the bored expressions of the aver-
age person, the lack of contact between people, and the lack 
of the capacity to plan seriously for overcoming the ever-
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increasing pollution of our natural ecology. From Fresno's 
perspective loss of hope is typically followed by (a) resigned 
optimism which hopes for the best without bothering to 
recognize that not even the good, but perhaps the worst may 
occur, (b) hardening of the heart or loss of compassion or 
empathy, and (c) destructiveness and violence. Besides 
these effects of the loss of hope, man also expresses his 
hopelessness in phrase making and adventurism, in forcing 
what cannot be forced, and in his nihilistic philosophies. 
Raskin (1970) stated that such symptoms may be Increasingly 
observed in the behaviour of twentieth-century youth. He 
states that young people who formerly seemed to be on the 
brink of having it made now seem gripped with despair. Both 
Fromm and Easkin see hopelessness and despair in a great 
variety of activities that constitute the substance of 
twentieth-century life. 
The individual experiences of hopelessness and 
despair are thought to be characterized by alienation from 
those relationships that man needs and desires to feel at 
home in the world. Despair and hopelessness entail a sense 
of loss of mutuality, where mutuality is understood in terms 
of positive relationships between man and the world, person 
and person, or man and himself. This experience may be 
accompanied by feelings of the 'too muchness of life,' the 
feeling of overwhelming futility, and a sense of the impos-
sible (Lynch, 1965). 
"•a1"* 
It has bmn said that the despairing person cannot 
perceive any goals that are worth striving for. Despair 
seems to be very similar to the state known as existential 
frustration and some forms of depression in which man cannot 
envision any meaning possibilities to be fulfilled and the 
environment is experienced as impoverished (Frankl, 1959). 
In despair there do not appear to be any resources (internal 
or external) that the individual can call upon and, even if 
there were, he could not find reason to take advantage of 
them. Despair seems to entail the phenomenal absence of 
valued end-states as well as the means to attain such end-
states. Despair can be viewed as a form of entrapment in 
which the individual's temporal perspectives are exclusively 
past and present. There are only those past experiences 
that led an individual to despair and the present moment of 
despair itself. Man experiences himself as trapped in an 
endlessly painful present on the basis of his past experi-
ences. His structures of thought, imagination, and feeling 
are rigid and inflexible. They are absolutized as the only 
reality—as the only possible reality. 
Marcel (1965) suggests that despair is a form of 
enchantment whose action has a bearing on all that goes on 
to form the very substance of a person's life. The despair-
ing man accepts only the perspective of established experi-
ence and believes that time will bring nothing new. 
m 
Tha despairing man not only contemplates and aata 
before himself tha dismal repetition, tha external* 
iiation of a situation In which he it caught like a 
ship In a ae« of ice. By & paradox that la diffi-
cult to inafifta* ha anticipates this repetition 
f Marcel* 196S* p. 1*2}* 
lata of hope, hopelessness and despair have been 
aoooelatod with oitttotiono wham tha inability to adapt to 
environmental factors sometimes leads to death. The tarns 
*swddan dmth* have ofton bean uaad to describe situations 
in whieh death aecwra ahartly after organisms have boon 
exposed to soma threatening stimulus. In situations like 
this da&th la thought to ha pracipitatad by tha nnyeho* 
la§iea! affect of throat that mmrm to xonXtoo hadlly resia-
tonco and oUowo path#la§y to take avar andt somotinas, 
daath la thouont to oecu* aa tha digoot result of poyaho* 
lotioal footnro thomoolvoo* Moorloo (1959) stated that in 
a w e oltuationo death any ha pwraly tha roawlt of war* 
whelming fa&r and aental shock, #$ ®Kp®timm%$4 In «orid 
liar IX altar tremendous fright, and ma seen far example in 
vooooo death» 
Besides death fnam obvious fear there seem to ha 
other psychological states that a m equally dangerous and 
debilitating. Mara specifically, hopelessness nas been 
identified as a precursor of death In % i-vide variety of 
situations* In tha casa of apathy deaths or 'giva-up-itlst• 
111 particular, death would aeett to ha closely related to 
tha dynamics of hopelessness and despair. Tha form of 
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reaction where an Individual seams to give up, than pines 
away mnd. dies, contrasts with tha reaction of those who 
panic and literally aaan to die of fright. In tha cas« of 
apathy death tha individual actually ^mmm to accept tha 
idea of death and dies without any apparent panic. 
Physiological interpretations have boon provided to 
help us understand hath types of dsath. Cannon (1942), 
far example, interpreted death from fright «a a consequence 
of proJkonnad o*o**tliMsi.ntion «f tha syi^athati£@**diawal 
system, tfhon an individual it threatened by some aspect 
#f tha anviirannant and sonata la pani® « flight* ha nonil* 
lxo« hadlly raaainreaa for aetian that will ononlo M m to 
daal with tha particular threat. If action la not possible 
and a hiojh lovol of bodily activity it nalntalnad* dooth. la 
of ton quick to follow* Victino ara a^aetad to hraatha vary 
rapidly, have a rapid pulse, and show a hefaocoacentration 
sotttitifti f ran loaa of fluids from tha hl«ad t# tha tlaawaa. 
Tha heart beats faster and footo* leading to a state of 
constant contraction and, ultimately, to cardiac arrest and 
daath. 
Apathy daatha a* fivn«an*itio hava nana attritouiad 
to a different physiological reaction on tha basis of 
ftl«htar*a (lf»7) a^arlnantatlan with **to« Riehtar found 
that shortly attar tnoataian 1 M a tank of watar some domes-
ticated rata would twin to the bottom and die. Tha incidance 
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of this form of death Increased when the rats* whiskers were 
clipped, depriving there of important orienting information. 
Sosie rats died before iraaaersion during the time that they 
were constrained in a pouch used to deliver them from their 
cage to the water tank. Suspecting over-activity of the 
sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system, the 
investigators measured heart rate by electrocardiographic 
procedures. The recordings showed an initial high rate and 
then a slowing to the time of death. Slowing of respiration 
and a lowering of body temperature were also observed. 
Ultimately the heart stopped in diastole after 
having shown a steady gradual decrease in rate* As 
expected, autopsy revealed a large heart distended 
with blood. These findings indicate that the rats 
way have died a so-called vagus death, which is the 
result of over-stimulation of the parasympathetic 
rather than the syupatheticoadrenal system. 
It should be pointed out that the first 
response to stress, whether that of restraint in the 
hand or confinement in the water jars, was often m 
accelerated heart rate; only subsequently, with pro-
longation of the stress situation, was this followed 
by slowing. In sosie rats the latter response 
developed very promptly, in others not for a few 
minutes [p. 196J. 
It is especially significant that the sequence of 
reactions from apparent panic to an acceptance of the situ-
ation and giving up is paralleled where huraans have found 
themselves in situations wh®x:@ escape is perceived as impos-
sible, i.e. hopeless situations. Basedow {in Barker, 1963) 
has presented a vivid picture of this reaction as the result 
of bone-pointing* 
4S 
The man who discovers that he is being boned by any 
enemy is, indeed, a pitiable sight. He stands 
aghast, ¥<?ith his eyes staring at the treacherous 
pointer, and with hands lifted as though to ward off 
the lethal medium, which he imagines is pouring into 
nis body. His cheeks blanch and his eyes become 
glassy and the expression on his face becomes ter-
ribly distorted. . . . He attempts to shriek but 
usually the sound chokes in his throat, and all that 
one might see is froth at his mouth. His body 
begins to tremble and the swseles twist involuntar-
ily. He sways backwards and falls to the ground, 
and after a short time appears to be in a swoon? but 
soon after he writhes as if in mortal agony, and, 
covering his face with his hands, begins to »oan. 
After a while he becomes very composed and crawls to 
his hut. . . * His death is only a matter of a com-
paratively short time [p. 21j. 
In situations such a© the one described above, the social 
behaviour of the tribe would seera to have a strong influence 
on how a native reacts to bone-pointing and, for that mat-
ter, to any form of voodoo that is supposed to result in 
death. The iraaediate family, relatives, and friends of the 
native often withdraw their support. The bone-pointed 
native is left alone, regarded as taboo, and even treated as 
if he were dead* At a later point the tribe may perfona 
funeral rites where the native's next of kin sever his 
remaining contacts with the world and place hira in the 
proper position for dying. The suggestive power of these 
activities, to a person who already believes that he will 
die, would surely serve to maintain and/or increase his 
hopelessness over his situation and, ultimately, hasten his 
complete glving-up. 
The phenomenon of giving up under conditions of 
despair and hopelessness has been observed in diverse 
m 
contexts. The effect of hopelessness and despair may also 
vary in degree, from death in extreme situations to apathy 
and passivity in less extreme situations. Meerloo (1959) 
has indicated that persons starving during a famine often 
exhibit a cataleptic passivity and a surrender to death. It 
has been observed that children excluded from the home, com-
munity, or separated from the parents, sometimes exhibit a 
cataleptic reaction, that is a sudden iaBUobiiization and 
passivity, in the catalepsy of catatonia patients often 
describe their inner experience as being dead and waiting 
for rebirth. "Before their complete withdrawal fro» the 
world, these patients have sudden feelings of dying, the 
delusion of being crucified or drowned, or the feeling of a 
catastrophic decline in the world [Meerloo, 1959, p. 385].M 
The author is also aware of incidents where boats have cap-
sized and their occupants siiaply sink and drown with no 
apparent effort to stay afloat or save themselves. It seeias 
that there are a great variety of situations sphere individ-
uals tend to give up, become passive and motionless when 
they have been confronted by a threat. Such phenomena have 
bmm observed in animals, and in men in both primitive and 
more sophisticated cultures. 
The experiences of inmates in concentration camps 
provide many clear examples of what appears to be despair. 
Frankl (1959) has described what he saw as a typical reac-
tion to incarceration: 
-ao 
Usually it began with the prisoner refusing one 
morning to get dressed &md wash or go out on the 
parade grounds. No entreaties, no blows, no threats 
had any effect. He just lay there, hardly moving. 
If this crisis was brought about by illness, he 
refused to be taken to the sick-bay or to do any-
thing to help himself, He simply gave up. There he 
remained lying in his own excreta, and nothing 
bothered hira anymore [p. 113]. 
i 
Frankl stated that many men in the concentration 1 
camp believed that the real opportunities in life had 
passed. Those who saw no sense in life, no aln, and no pur- , 
pose, saw no reason for carrying on. Their lives seemed to 
be absolutely without a future. Soase regarded their lives 
as over and done, as if they had already died. The effect 
was to rob the present of its reality. It was easy to over-
look opportunities to make something positive of camp life, 
to take advantage of opportunities that really did exist. 
There was no hope for those who did not see a future. 
Frankl points out that any atteopt to restore a 
man's inner strength in the camp had first to succeed in 
showing him son*© future goal. This idea has essentially the 
saae meaning as the often-quoted phrase by Nietzsche: "he 
who has a why to live for can bear alaost any how.'* In 
other words, the individual who sees some purpose or goal in 
his life is taore able to endure the pain he encounters on 
the road to fulfilling that purpose or attaining that goal. 
From Frankl's point of view, having a future goal or purpose 
made the crucial difference; it was their salvation in the 
most difficult moments of existence; it gave them hope. 
u 
The accounts of concentration carap experiences, 
apathy deaths, and other phenomena in this section provide a 
basis for drawing a tentative distinction between hopeless-
ness and despair. On the one hand, hopelessness may be a 
state where a person feels that a certain goal cannot be 
attained, though he remains aware of that goal, desires and 
values it. In despair, on the other hand, there way be an 
actual devaluing of goals, leading to an absence of goals 
and the phenomenal experience of roeaninglessness. The per-
son who gives up nay actually give up a goal or goals that 
were once very important. 
ttPPa. **hd fit0.AMY 
From the Meanings attributed to hopelessness and 
despair it would seem that the experience of hope is closely 
associated with the notion of possibility. Possibility may 
be understood to mean that reality cannot be exhaustively 
defined or predicted. Keen (1968) suggests that hope begins 
here, that is, with the realization that hu»an experience is 
inadequate to deal with all the possibilities that reality 
harbours. One might say that in hope there is the implicit 
recognition that reality is not fixed or crystallized, but 
open-ended and contains resources that have not been dis-
covered. Resources siay refer to valued end-states or goals, 
as well as the ©tans by which goals can be realized. 
This element of possibility in hope is closely 
related to our view of the past. Marcel (1965) stated that 
m 
in hope there is the realization that wthe aore the real is 
real the less does it lend itself to a calculation on the 
basis of accepted experience [p. 191].w In hope one adopts 
a different orientation than those who adhere only to the 
real® of past experience and the knowledge accrued from such 
experience. The acceptance of past reality as the only 
reality brings with it the ". . . supposition that time will 
bring nothing new beyond an illustration or an added con-
firmation of the pronouncements engraved on the tables of 
universal wisdom . . . [Marcel, p. 191]*** This is the same 
as saying that we live in a world where time no longer 
passes or where time passes but does not bring anything new. 
Although past life aay be the surest and the most 
certain life lived, it is obviously not the only life. Hope 
attests to alternate life—store enigmatic, uncertain, and at 
first only contained in the notion of possibility. Hope 
seems to have little bearing on the realm of rights and cer-
tainties based on past experience. It encompasses a broad 
reality which includes yet goes beyond what established 
experience has to offer. 
It has been said that the procesa hoping entails two 
views of one world, two views that encompass contrasting 
qualities of experience. On the one hand, there art the 
ingredients of experience that give reason to despair or 
become hopeless; on the other hand, there is the realm of 
possibility within which there is rooa for something positive 
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to occur* this viewpoint haa boon cifWC«»o4 by Mareal and 
others. Raskin (1970) doptatad hope aa a»c#ap#*aiii§ p&lj* 
and tragedy aa wall aa beauty and Jay* 1 A reference to hla 
personal dovolojMont, Ooroff (1970) talked of how tea had 
m&vwk from an unfeeling state to a place whore ha axperi-
enced hath groatox pain and a positive feeling ha called 
hope. 
Tha accoptajieo of e«ntraatia# qaalitloo of axpaari* 
oneo ouoffoata that lit hap* aa* istttvas tawrd m i«tagrati«i 
of xaalityfa oontonto* Thia viou wm c*pso«totf by tciarfea* 
gaard who oo* in hapa tha attaspt to raaolva tha nantradla** 
tiom of U f a thrattfh a ayathaaia of «»«asalty mA poaalbil* 
Ity (la Pxuoyor* 1963)* Similarly, Stan* (1970) §«* hapa aa 
a unifying faotor Nfelch d«w» 4X«pcxatc olamnt* together 
within tha aognitivo f laid, In haplnf one wm% toa mid to 
attempt to integrate peat aispaiieiica with vital feere and mm 
Mononto and an opattaaas and viafeility in tha face of tha 
fwtwra (Marina, 1970)* 
There i« a certain similarity between tha view that 
hope eervet an integrating function and AUport*e (190ft) 
nation of tha 'prapriyat* or thaaa aapacte of tha poroonal«» 
Ity that ara central to existence and make far Inward unity* 
It waa /Ulparfc** pooition that preprlate functioning 
includes conflict and la basically opposed Or resistant to 
equilibrium In human life* i.e., tension hatttfaan tha actual 
§4 
and the possible is maintained rather than reduced. It is 
interesting to note that Stern (1970) thought that to truly 
entertain hope one must disregard the terras resolution of 
conflict, since hope exists within an ever-expanding organ-
ismic tension system. He saw the therapist's most important 
task as that of providing reverence for the dynamic tension 
that is found in hope. 
As hoping seems to entail an awareness of the pos-
sible, the hopar nay be understood to experience a sense of 
futurity in the present (Stern, 1970), In hope there seeds 
to be a sense of af fines tion of what the future holds in 
store, that which represents an alternative to past and 
present negative states of affairs* This sense of affirma-
tion ©ay be closely associated with the element of belief. 
Although the relationship between hope and belief has not 
been thoroughly examined to the bast of the author1s know-
ledge, there seem to be good reasons to identify belief as a 
central element in the experience of hope. 
ftftA^t Mm*,,m$,M%M$p-mpm ,<**., ftforcnM., fit »Mty, 
The idea that belief is soaetistes an important 
aspect of tha experience of hope is supported by some pre-
liminary data. A number of students who were asked to 
describe what hope meant to then responded with meanings 
such as "belief," "belief in the future—for the good,** md 
Ma total personal coamiitjaent to believing that something 
» 
will or will not happen." Several theorists have also 
pointed to the role of belief in the experience of hope. 
For Wheatley (1958) hoping entailed 'belief in possibility* 
and Lynch (1965) stated that hope w. * .is energized by the 
belief in the possibility of getting somewhere, in the pos-
sibility of reaching goals [p. 31].M Baunana (1970) defined 
hope as **. * . knowing where you are inside yourself and 
with the world . . . then truly believing in both [p. 62]." 
Day (1969) felt that the belief in hope was rational or 
based on evidence. Since the hoping person was understood 
to believe in a probability estimate that was based on evi-
dence indicating that what was hoped for would be realized, 
his belief, therefore, was based on evidence and a process 
of reasoning. 
It is important to recognise that the absence of 
evidence or reasons in support of a belief does not preclude 
the possibility of believing. As Tiilich (1957) points outs 
"Sometimes . . . one believes something which has a low 
probability or is strictly improbable, though not impossible 
[p. SI].1* Sargant (1968) has described numerous instances 
where people have suddenly and uncritically accepted ideas, 
thoughts, and happenings which sake nonsense and contradict 
all the rest of their ordered and computed knowledge. He 
states that under conditions of stress new impressions, com-
mands and ideas often become iaperatlve in their nmd for 
acceptance and ring absolutely true; they are believed* 
m 
Tiilich and Sargant have identified a form of belief 
that has bmn more explicitly defined by Meissner (1969) as: 
", . .an assent to and acceptance of a truth and a reality 
without the usual props of intellectual conviction [p. 50].w 
In this kind of belief om cannot ascribe reasons or provide 
arguments or point to compelling evidences. The belief is 
set off from reason, and sometimes opposed to it. The 
believer is rationally vulnerable. While in reasoning on© 
arrives at his convictions and certitudes by a process of 
investigation and argument, in this kind of belief one does 
not. 
It is generally understood that beliefs are psycho-
logical necessities throughout the course of life; they 
stand as positively adaptive elements within the psychic 
economy* Beliefs help to maintain and elaborate one's self-
identity as it acknowledges an identification with meaning-
ful institutions and ideologies. It is not an oversimplifi-
cation to say that beliefs, like hopes, often attest to the 
reality of a meaningful world, 
Hope and belief seem to be related at another level 
of analysis. If hope is understood as an assent to, and 
2 
Although many theorists would draw a distinction 
between faith and belief, Sargant (1968) and Meissner (1969) 
use the two terms interchangeably. To avoid confusion in 
the present analysis, the word 'faith' should be understood 
to refer to the definition of belief provided by Meissner. 
Any other meaning of the word faith is beyond the scope of 
this analysis. 
tw 
acceptance and affirmation of the possible or a specific 
possibility in situations where past and present experience 
suggests a highly negative state of affairs, then hoping 
would sometimes seem to involve an act that transcends or 
contradicts the content of established experience* If this 
is so, then an act of belief, that is belief in possibility, 
¥**ould seem to be one way in which an individual could accom-
plish this transcending act. The hoper may acknowledge the 
truth and reality of a possibility or a specific possibility 
solely through an act of belief, without being able to offer 
intellectual support for that belief. 
The role of belief in the experience of hope may be 
further described In theoretical terms. It has already hmm 
pointed out that in hope one may affirm a possible good to 
come in spite of evidence to the contrary. As Prusyer 
(1963) has noted, however, in hoping one does not predicate 
that such and such will happen, nor does one claim that such 
and such must happen. Hope is outside the realm of rights 
and certainties. Likewise, most beliefs do not entail per-
fect certainty. Beliefs are rarely perfect, and although a 
person can affirm in belief, that belief is always being 
challenged by reasons to the contrary, all the finite evi-
dence of which the believer is aware. Beliefs can never be 
static or complete. They are dynamic and their realisations 
are never total or final (Meissner, 1969). although belief 
does consist in an affirmation, the process of believing 
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inclydea doubt and uncertainty due to contradictory elements 
in the field* This understanding of belief would seem to ha 
a further raaaaa to eee belief aa part of tha etyneftice of 
hoping* tfcie la eseentially what Calian (1969) seemed to 
understand when ha atated that it la tha alaaanta of aff ine* 
ation and contradiction «hich allow far hmpm and serve to 
maintain it« Siftilarlyt this wa«ld ooeai to he what Prwayar 
i 1963) meant when ha said that certainty md uncertainty 
aaiet hath ha present in mwdms far hoeing to occur* 
The uncertainty of a hope hmmd ©n belief la 
reflected In etatemnt* which attribute a certain fragility 
%nd delicacy to hope, the following axaftplat illustrate 
thio point* 
CI) Hope is Ilka a harebell trembling from ita birth** 
Ca) Mopaa m y ha frail but fond*-
Tha fragility of hope again attaete to what ia understood 
about tha dynamics of belief9 where one haa tha capacity to 
acknowledge a positive possibility in epite of evidence to 
tha contrary andt at tha same time, la subject to moments of 
doubt and uncertainty on tha baaia of that vary evidence* 
Tha role of belief in tha emparlance of hope it fur* 
ther supported on the basis that the conditions which pre* 
cede belief md hope are frequently the same. Sargant 
(1968) haa indicated that there ara many instances where 
total despair end dmmp depression have bean followed by 
feelings of salvation and faith: 
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The sudden and desired change, with the acquisition 
of a 'saving* faith, generally took place only under 
tremendous emotional pressures of guilt, anxiety, 
and feelings of personal helplessness md impending 
disaster [p. 508J. 
Sargant pointed out that absolute passivity and giving up in 
battle are often followed by the acquisition of a faith or 
belief, Madame Guyon, a great Quietist, also expressed this 
opinion: " . . . perfect souls are those without action, 
without inclination . . . and 'in a state of complete death* 
until sudden breakthrough to faith occurs [in Sargant, 1968, 
p# 512]." The similarity of the conditions that precede the 
acquisition of a belief and the experience of hope would 
seem to further support the possibility that belief some-
times plays an important role in the experience of hope. 
The present analysis suggests that hope may be 
experienced without the aid of reasons that suggest that the 
possibility to which hope refers will be realized. On this 
basis, it is possible to speak of an experience of hope that 
depends on only the symbolic representation or image of a 
certain possibility that is initially accepted without 
analysis or criticism through an act of belief} or, in a 
more general sense, depends simply in belief in possibility. 
This approach to the experience of hope clearly contrasts 
with the earlier and more cognitive view of hope as expecta-
tion, involving a process of reasoning and an estimation of 
probabilities. 
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The Individual who hopes for a specific possibility 
may be understood to be living in a state \*th®x® Inconsistent 
perceptions co-exist. Although he accepts a certain possi-
bility as real, he remains aware of information that contra-
dicts the possibility of his hope being realized. On the 
basis of the previous distinction between wishing, optimism, 
and hop®, the person who wishes or is optimistic would prob-
ably be more likely to deny contradictory evidence rather 
than accept it. 
The sense of affirmation experienced in hope is con-
sistent with the view that hope helps man endure his trials 
and sufferings, all the negatives of life to which he is 
exposed. Wenninger (1959) looked at hope in terms of its 
sustaining function in life, and Prusyer saw in hope the 
determination to stick with the scheme of things. The same 
thought was expressed differently by Raskin (1970)? "Hope 
provides the spirit for going on with life, the knowledge 
that life is a struggle, the acceptance of it being a strug-
gle [p. 38]." The sustaining effect of hope can be associ-
ated with the idea that hope is a 'comforter' (Stern, 1970), 
that the affirmation of possibility in hope attenuate© pain-
ful conditions in the present. Emily Uickinson also saw 
this aspect of hope. In a poem entitled Hone she wrote: 
And sweetest in the gal® is heard; 
And sore must be the storm 
That could abash the little bird 
That kept so many warm* 
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Tha view of hope m* « cossforter and a sustainer la 
consistent with the idea that tha experience of nope i« 
antithetical to death and hfyman dapotantlatlen mml closely 
tied to tha workinga of tha life Instinct. Bit a latter view 
mm axpraaead by Prossa (1963) who viewed hope mm a psychic 
cawaltaaat to U f a and growth, it wae alailarly expressed 
by Mawmo (1970)t ***** hop* la a creative forcaf the 
directed energy at being which originates, touches, moves, 
inspire* and bullda Cp* 863 •* 
Marcel likened tha mmprntimnttm of b*p# to a f aailng 
of trust In tha process of continual creation* To hops 
meant first accepting tha pain aa real and, while doing so, 
seeing It aa capable of being absorbed ami transmuted by tha 
working* of a trtatlva probata of ftowtfe end davelopaeiit* 
Marcei thought that hoping actually required tome degree of 
surrender1 to faircaa aKtasaal to anaaalf
 f to tha power of 
antea and tha reality of yet wrartallwd possibility* Tula 
act of depend®!*©© seemed to acknowledge that hop© §i»y not 
self-initiated a&tlaft* lilt alaa Oil what aitlaes independontly 
of hla action. The locus of responsibility asovsa to exter-
nal force* hecaitea Marcel thought that despair always pre* 
€mdm4 hop*, and the despairing person could not perceive 
himself at able to change hla situation. 
In situations where an individual deea accept a oar* 
tain possibility and thus experiences hope* an important 
m 
orfenltftic variable nay be the Individual^ auaGoptibllity 
to e*i#ge»tl@n aa thia aliewe him to »«#apt and baliava in a 
certain possibility, and thus experience hope* The impor-
tance of suggestion is probably raost relevant to hope baaed 
on ballet Aero belief involves trusting seasons else. 
tealdee that fern of belief in which someone acknowledges 
•earthing to be tnta without b«ia§ able to offer auffiaieat 
reason, there it alao that form of belief where sooeone la 
truttad without beiiif able to offer Mftlciejit rewona for 
that trust. The individual who trusts someone eis© would be 
lifcaly to aeeapt thair •uggaatlone with regard to tha poa* 
eifela or •pacific poealbilitiae* and hone* could eitpari#n«e 
hope through Jtflneona «lse# 
la thia torn of beplai tha individual wtwld mm® to 
e**itowl#dfa that hla paraonal rccaurcc* are not efwwiii or 
outf ielent in tbawelve** that they nuat be added to imm 
the antatda* To emparlance hope in thia way» mm would not 
need to pummlm hlaaelf aa being able to bring about what 
ha hopes fori rather, ha nay perceive bJjaeeii aa having to 
object of hla hope* Thia lad lynch (1965) to poalt tha ale* 
went of mutuality In hope—that la hope depends on an inter* 
acting relationship, an interacting contribution that occurs 
between wan and tha world* or between person and person, out 
of which something new and free la bom. "A* it [hope] 
occurs
 9 • * it means nothing laaa than that mm can depend 
63 
3 
on one another [Lynch, 1965, p. 24j.M H© subsequently 
defined hope as M• . . an interior sense that there is help 
on the outside of us [in Stein, 1971, p. 221]." 
,\fo.pte on MetaDhy.^^ca\.,M9P^*'"^,ahrie^ Mffrfce,!, 
The dynamics of hoping are often depicted in set-
tings where the content of hope refers to identifiable end-
states or objectives. This form of hoping is characteristic 
of locutions such as Ml hope that . • ." or "There is hope 
that . . . .w Many of those who describe hope refer its 
contents to specific and meaningful possibilities. Marcel's 
position is an exception to this orientation since he 
describes hope at a different level of huraan experience. In 
Marcel*s terms one does not hope for specific possibilities, 
but for global and, sometimes, for unspecifiable states. 
The objects of hope are vague and diffuse. Marcel provides 
a metaphysical perspective characterized by the expression 
"I hope" rather than "I hope that . . . • * 
Marcel viewed the hoping person as transcending both 
the specific objects to which he might initially be attached 
and the desire for such objects. His understanding of hope 
3 
Although it represents a departure from the present 
phenonenologicai analysis, it is worthwhile to point out 
that Stotland (1968) has treated the experience of hope 
where hope is contingent on others in terms of the concept 
of expectation. More specifically, Stotland indicates that 
communications from others or the mere perception of others 
in certain situations are events that can arouse hopeful 
schemas (expectations). Such schemas may apply to either 
the individual's personal ability to achieve certain goal© 
or the ability of others to aid him or achieve those goals 
for hiou 
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was bound up in what he termed M. . . a method of surmount-
ing, by which thought rises above the imaginings md formu-
lations upon which it had first be®n tempted to depend 
[p* 185].** He describes his position its super-rational and 
untechnical, i.e., not concerned with how the content of 
hope will be realized. He saw hope as an absolute quality, 
free from all the limitations of specific circumstances. He 
stateds 
W© can imagine the Inner disposition of one who, 
setting no condition or limit and abandoning himself 
in absolute confidence, would thus transcend all 
possible disappointment and would experience a 
security of his being, which Is contrary to the 
radical insecurity of Having [p. 186]. 
. . „ only those beings who are entirely free from 
the shackles of ownership in all its forms are able 
to know the divine light-heartedness of life in hope 
[p. 200]. 
As Marcel understood hope to be a transcendent real-
ity and a quality of spiritual life, it did not involve any 
process of reasoning. For Marcel, the placing of one's con-
fidence in reasons and the holding to a specific object 
orientation could only result in a distortion of what he 
considered to be the true nature of hope. If one did so, 
Marcel felt that he would lose the aptitude for hope, as 
well as the ability to believe in its possibility. 
Marcel's idea that the hoping person is oriented 
toward valued states of * being* rather than material states 
deserves particular emphasis. This position is similar to 
Allport's (1955) concept of fbecoming* where human values 
may be understood as the terrain! of our hopes, though never 
to be fully realized. Stern (1970) also expressed this view 
of hope when he defined it as % . # man and his world in 
their becoroingness* It is a never-ending process of finding 
the authentic task which may never be fully found [p» 20]," 
The metaphysical understanding of hope represents a 
meaningful extension of the range of meanings encompassed by 
the concept of hope. That there are many meanings of hope 
would seem to suggest that what we call *hQpQ* may be 
experienced in different ways and in varied contexts. Hope 
may be one concept that meaningfully reflects the vicissi-
tudes and complexities that characterize human life. 
Overview and Commentary 
The present analysis of hop® has drawn from a wide 
variety of sources to provide a roulti-meaning perspective, 
as well as an outline of some of the conditions that seem to 
be Involved in the experience of hope. Apart from the 
numerous meanings ascribed to hope and the varied levels of 
abstraction at which hope can be viewed, there appear to be 
two major trends of thought concerning the conditions that 
pertain to the experience of hope* 
First of all, there is a contemporary model that 
depicts the experience of hope in situations where an indi-
vidual *s ties to reality are rational and he is perceived as 
an action-oriented being. His hope is based on his personal 
abilities to achieve whatever he hopes for and the reasons 
he has for seeing hiwself as able to do so. This view of 
hope would seera to be most closely associated with the con-
cept of expectation and the estimation of probabilities that 
certain goals will be attained. A primary value attributed 
to hope in contemporary contexts is its functional utility, 
that is, how hope helps raan attain his goals. 
The alternate picture of hope is grounded in pheno-
menology and emphasizes (a) man's receptivity to and depend-
ence on the resources of external reality, and (b) the 
awareness of possibility generally and/or the acceptance of 
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a particular possibility as these entail an act of belief. 
The role of belief in the experience of hope is especially 
significant since there are many situations in which reasons 
to hope may not be available, and even if they are, they nay 
not be sufficiently strong to counteract reasons that sug-
gest that what one hopes for Is unlikely or impossible. 
Besides these characteristics, the value of hope in the 
phenomenological context seems to lie in its sustaining and 
comforting effect rather than the actualization or attain-
ment of specific goals. 
Although there are two fairly distinct formulations 
of hope in the literature, it may be unwise to think of the 
experience of hope only in terras of one form of the experi-
ence or the other. On some occasions, it would be more 
realistic to think of hope in terns of the intermingling of 
the elements of each formulation, Man reasons and he 
believes, he taakes use of his own abilities to attain goals, 
and he often depends on resources external to himself to 
attain the same goals. 
There is a certain intellectual appeal to the idea 
that reasoning, belief, action, and dependency on the 
resources of external reality intermingle in the experience 
of hope. Whether this always happens in reality or to what 
extent it does remains questionable, and there are reasons 
that suggest that one form of the experience of hope is more 
likely to occur in some situations than others. 
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Within any one cultural or societal context, the 
values of that setting often influence whether a person will 
be action-oriented or more passive, whether he will be a 
believer or a more reasoning person. Man often finds him-
self in a position where he is requested to polarize him-
self, to accept one way of functioning rather than another. 
To some extent the environmental conditions will determine 
which form of hope he is more likely to experience. To the 
extent that one setting emphasizes the conditions pertaining 
to a particular model of hope, it raay limit the possibility 
of experiencing hope where hope is based on the conditions 
of an alternate model. 
This point may be illustrated in relation to one 
discernible trend in North American life. With the reversal 
of the man-God polarities in the twentieth century, it is 
expected that man will do what tiod was once expected to do. 
That is, some see man as having to create ex nihiio, to 
improvise value and meaning out of unlimited freedoo (Keen, 
1970). The current values and meaning often flow one way--
from man to the world. Man is often perceived as a giver 
and a creator of meaning rather than a recipient. His 
actions play a central role in the creation of meaning; they 
are viewed as the aeans by which such meaning is attained. 
This perspective is sometimes manifested In a cul-
tural emphasis on independent activity: 
m 
We are often forced by our culture to deny depend-
ence, passivity, the wish and ability to receive. 
We do not seem to be able to rest. We have the 
greatest difficulty in being passive, in doing 
nothing. We are afraid of the gentler eraotions. 
We misinterpret the wishes we have in these direc-
tions, and the wishes to be received and be loved, 
as though the wishes were wrong and had to be sup-
pressed like the plague. As though, according to 
our culture . . * there came a point where we are 
supposed to be grown up and not have such thoughts; 
as though at some initiated age of twenty-one we are 
no longer beings who have been created and received 
at all; as though we must no longer use help of any 
kind [Lynch, 1965, p. 236j. 
To the extent that man acts in accordance with this cultural 
bias, his experience of hope may be more or less restricted 
to those situations where he can perceive himself to be 
effective in attaining goals, rather than being able to 
depend on resources external to himself, furthermore* where 
he cannot perceive himself as being effective, he nay not foe 
able to experience hope. 
The possibility of experiencing hope in some situ-
ations may well depend on the realization of some of the 
limitations of human existence and abdication from preten-
sions of omnipotence where such attitudes are part of the 
cultural background. Where one does not perceive hisiself as 
the centre of reality, the world is perceived differently. 
It becomes possible to enjoy rather than exploit, to accept 
rather than grasp. Unlike the omnipotent being, roan is 
threatened by extremities, and he is sometimes in need of 
hope as this attests to a dependence on what lies outside 
himself. 
fo 
Likewise, a cultural emphasis on rationality may 
curtail the possibility of experiencing hope in some situ-
ations. This is based on the view that twentieth-century 
man's primary modus operandi consists of thought that is 
rationalistic, empirical, pragmatic, and operational* To 
the extent that this is man's exclusive orientation, it stay 
be impossible for him to acknowledge anything that trans-
cends the categories of established experience. It aay be 
impossible for him to hope where hope Is based on belief. 
This is what Marcel (1965) understood when he stated that a 
cold blooded approach to reality leads neither to hope nor 
despair. 
The need to control the realm of possibility raay be 
viewed as an additional factor that limits the chance of 
experiencing hope. It seems to have become increasingly 
necessary to adopt every means to eliminate possibility. 
Many want reasons, proof, and certitude in the form of per-
fect predictability before they will take any hope seriously 
(FronBa* 1968). 
This eosMaentary is not meant to deny the importance 
and value of self-initiated and independent forms of activ-
ity or processes of reasoning as these may lead to hopeful 
expectations. It is only ueant to point out that action and 
reasoning may not always be a sufficient basis for hope, and 
to the extent that these ways of behaving are adopted as an 
exclusive reality, they may curtail the possibility of 
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experiencing hope in some situations. 
There are also many situations in our culture which 
involve dependent forms of relationship and believing with-
out reasons, and where these ways of behaving are over-
emphasized, there is likely to be an absence of hope based 
on action or reason. Beliefs would reduce the chances of 
experiencing hope particularly in situations where the 
beliefs are antithetical to hope or where the content of a 
belief discourages man fro® acting or reasoning. Further-
more, it is often more realistic that man act in his own 
behalf, and to do so would be a more valued form of activity. 
A more dependent orientation would reduce this possibility. 
It is obvious that man has complex needs and desires, 
and it can be said that he sometimes has hope that his needs 
will be fulfilled and his desires realized. At this stage 
in his evolution, one of his most important hopes may well 
be that he grow in insight to understand which model of hope 
is more valuable and appropriate for both himself a^nd others 
at any one time and place. We may also hope that he will 
have the courage to act and reason if these activities are 
needed, and depend on others and believe in the 'possible* 
in situations that are clearly beyond his ability to influ-
ence. 
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